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1 Introduction
In the oil market, the sellers’ cartel and large suppliers communicate like central bankers
with the market, emphasizing credibility and security of supply. Why do sellers care
about the security of supply? In this paper, we analyze how producers manage their
demand given the buyers’ interest in ending their dependence on producers’ supply.
Such interests are prevalent as demand side policies reduce macroeconomic risks and
environmental externalities. Policies also exploit network externalities, so that energy
infrastructure choices are often seen to require centralized decision making. Given con-
cerns over global warming, these interests are also intergovernmental and they aim at
an economy-wide change in the energy demand infrastructure. In such a market, pro-
ducers’ perception of future demand becomes intertwined with the buyers’ interest in
ending the relationship, and it is no longer clear that even a coherent seller side would
see the traditional restricted-supplies policy as its best-interest policy.1 For public policy
in oil-importing countries, it is important to understand not only the risks of continued
resource dependence, but also the sellers’ eﬀort to distort the buyers’ decision on ending
the relationship.
The economic nature of the relationship between major oil-importers and exporters
such as United States and Saudi Arabia is clearly not a direct bargaining situation, as
international contracts are not conceivable in this context. However, the relationship
has a flavor of bargaining taking place through markets. Sellers’ focus on secure supply
suggests a compensation to the importing party for continuing potentially costly depen-
dence. On the buyer side, trust in the relationship is expressed by voluntary inaction,
that is, postponement of actions changing the demand structure. It seems clear that the
sellers’ concern for security of supply will be diﬀerent once the buyer side has committed
resources to activities that aim at ending the dependence on supply in the foreseeable
future. To capture elementary properties of such a market-based bargaining, we model
it as a bilateral monopoly situation where one side coordinates on supplies and the other
on timing of change of the demand infrastructure.
We find that the relationship must become more costly over time, because the re-
source available for a potentially long transition towards substitute supplies is depleted.
1The following citation describes the concern: “We’ve got almost 30 percent of the world’s oil. For us,
the objective is to assure that oil remains an economically competitive source of energy. Oil prices that
are too high reduce demand growth for oil and encourage the development of alternative energy sources”
(Adel al-Jubeir, foreign policy adviser of crown prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Herald Tribune, Jan
24, 2007).
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Producers have to compensate buyers for increasing costs, and therefore the seller side
has to supply larger quantities from declining stocks to postpone the start of the tech-
nology transition. The result is in sharp contradiction with the standard prediction that
greater scarcity leads to lower supplies, but it follows quite naturally if one expects that
finiteness of supply increases costs during the transition towards the demand change.
In connection with oil, it is clear that the world will never run out of all fossil fuel
sources when we include unconventional oils, tar sands, and coal, but it is equally clear
that we may run out of conventional, cheap oil. The resource that, for example, Saudi
Arabia is controlling is unique in that it allows extraction of high quality output with
relatively little capital investment. It also allows for rapid and large production rate
changes. Reserves with such properties are at the heart of the economics of the oil de-
pendence because, roughly put, the remainder of the fossil fuel supply is capital intensive
and costly when used for the production of liquid fuels. In fact, what is essential for the
strategic interaction between the seller and buyer is the existence of a very competitive
but finite reserve with inelastic short-run demand; the rest of ‘oil’ production can be
seen as part of substitute fuel production, including nonconventional oils, biofuels, and
alternative energy sources.2
Though being very competitive, the core conventional oil stocks are not managed
like most productive assets in market economies. The dynasties of the Middle East do
not disclose technical production information and make eﬀorts to prevent auditing of
the reserves. The future availability of conventional oil is a major public concern in oil
importing countries, and industry experts’ opinions on the size of economically viable
stocks diverge widely.3 This informational asymmetry is a potential risk associated with
OPEC’s role as the central banker of the oil market. We find that when the size of the
remaining reserve is only privately observed by the seller side, there is an incentive to
exploit the buyers’ imperfect information for right timing of the demand change. We
describe an equilibrium with a persistent possibility of a price shock as the seller side
hides true reserves by currently supplying large quantities postponing buyers’ action to a
2The diﬀerence between conventional and nonconventional oils is concisely explained in the Hirsch
Report (prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, 2005). The report also makes clear that the
important scarcity is in the reserves of high-quality conventional oil.
3These concerns are reviewed in the Hirsch report. A book by Matthew R. Simmons (2005) explicates
carefully the industry experts concerns regarding the Saudi stocks. In particular, Saudies have not
disclosed technical production information since the early 1980. Therefore, the maturity of the main
Saudi stocks (six main oil fields) cannot be addressed, leading to concerns that suppliers cannot expand
production further in the near future.
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point that makes the technology transition period an era of scarcity. This suggests a risk
in the relationship: continued resource dependence delegates the timing of the demand
change to the informed party, that is, to the seller, who initiates the change through the
revelation of the true scarcity.
Our research departs from previous literature on the topic by allowing a market struc-
ture with implicit oﬀers and responses such that no party is in explicit leadership. In
particular, the structure preserves the nature of the strategic interaction in the limiting
case without discounting, which allows an essentially static analysis and it shows the way
to analyze the discounted case. The reduction in the dynamic dimension also enables
us to analyze the asymmetric information case, which is nonexisting in the literature.
Moreover, in addition to market structure assumptions and asymmetric information, we
depart from previous literature in that we abstract from the precise instrument imple-
menting the structural change: when action is taken, it changes the demand irreversibly
after a time lag. This abstraction simplifies the strategic variable on the buyer side while
keeping what seems material in the relationship.
Previous literature can be divided on the assumptions made for the strategic variable
on the buyer’s side. First, there is a large literature on optimal tariﬀs in depletable-
resource markets showing how coordinated action on the buyer side can be used to
decrease the seller’s resource rent (e.g., Newbery, 1983, Maskin and Newbery, 1990; see
Karp and Newbery 1993 for a review). While import tariﬀs and fuel taxes are impor-
tant, they are more flexible instruments as compared to the development of substitute
technologies that have a permanent eﬀect on the resource dependence. The latter thus
creates potentially greater or at least very diﬀerent strategic threats for the seller. To be
eﬀective, the optimal tariﬀs have to be successful in changing the dynamic demand per-
ceived by the seller. The degree of success obviously depends on the precise formulation
of the game, but generally the seller’s sales path still follows a Hotelling rule modified to
take into account the buyers’ tariﬀ policy. This leads to supplies declining over time. We
believe that the technology threat potentially is a more important determinant of how
sellers perceive their future demand.
Second, there is a large but somewhat dated literature on the same bilateral monopoly
situation where the buyers’ strategic variable is to develop or adopt a substitute technol-
ogy. Early papers such as Dasgupta et al. (1983), Gallini et al. (1983), and Hoel (1983)
assume the buyers exploit a Stackelberg leadership and commit to a deterministic R&D
program for the development of the substitute. The results provide interesting insights
into how the buyer side can extract the seller’s rent by altering the timing of sales. Later
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developments analyzed the role of leadership and commitment (Lewis et al., 1986) and,
finally, probabilistic success in R&D and Markov-perfect strategies (Harris and Vickers,
1995). None of the above papers predict that supplies from declining stocks increase over
time.4
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we introduce the basic
resource allocation problem by considering the social optimum and consumers’ optimum.
In Section 3, we introduce and analyze the game under perfect information. In Section
4, we extend the basic model to the incomplete information case. In Section 5, the
deterministic version of the model is extended to include discounting. In Section 6, we
conclude by discussing alternative approaches to the problem and potential implications
for the oil market.
2 Optimal resource dependence
Before going to strategic interactions, we start the analysis by looking at socially optimal
resource use. This way we will introduce the basic elements of the model and provide a
benchmark so that distortions introduced by strategic market interactions become clear.
Consider an economy starting at time t = 0 with a finite resource endowment s0
that can be consumed at rate qt yielding a strictly concave utility eu(qt). The resource
has a substitute that provides the same service and ends the need to use the resource.
The economy can choose to adopt the substitute by paying one-time cost I > 0 at any
t, wait for k periods so that the alternative replaces the resource at t + k, and then
pay ongoing cost c > 0 per period for using the substitute. We deliberately abstract
from precise actions implementing the change in demand because the focus is on the
following trade-oﬀ: howmuch of the resource should be used before actions are taken, and
how much should be left for the transition period towards the substitute? Introducing
extraction cost for the resource, reducing irreversibility of the change in demand, or
including uncertainty regarding success of the process do aﬀect the precise answer to the
trade-oﬀ. However, that the substitute is costly and that it takes time to build up the
new demand infrastructure are the two assumptions that capture most of the action in
the strategic interaction.
To describe the social optimum, it is useful to treat the period over which there
is some resource consumption as an excursion from the long-run situation where the
4Harris and Vickers (1995) obtain a result that sales path may be non-monotonic but it is not
generically increasing.
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substitute is present and consumers enjoy surplus u¯ per period. The consumer price is
pt = ψ(qt) = eu0(qt), and demand is q = D(p) = ψ−1(p), so we can write the long-run
surplus flow as
u¯ = eu(D(0))− c.
The substitute thus replaces the resource fully.5 For future reference, we separate the
consumers and producers overall surplus from resource consumption. Sellers’ flow profit
is π(q) = ψ(q)q and assumed to be strictly concave. Consumers’ surplus is u(q) =eu(q) − π(q), and need not be concave.6 We assume that surplus u(q) is everywhere
nonlinear,7 diﬀerentiable, and bounded at some level above u¯. The resource can thus
provide surplus above the long-run level. Throughout the paper we assume that stock s0
is large enough, so that actions to end resource consumption are not taken at t = 0.
We assume no discounting for now.8 We denote the seller’s stock-dependent payoﬀ
by V (st) and consumers’ payoﬀ by W (st) if there has been no investment before t. Ex-
pression V (st) measures cumulative (undiscounted) future profits while W (st) measures
cumulative surplus from the excursion above the long-run surplus from period t onwards:9
V (st) =
Z T+k
t
π(qτ)dτ (1)
W (st) =
Z T+k
t
[u(qτ)− u]dτ (2)
The social optimum depends on the period of resource use, T + k, and the supply
path qt, that maximizes total resource surplus
W(st) = V (st) +W (st) =
Z T+k
t
[eu(qτ)− u]dτ (3)
5The assumption is made for the ease of exposition but we also think it reflects some realism. Alter-
natively, we can assume extraction costs and that the cost of using the substitute are lower.
6Consumer surplus will be a central determinant of the buyer’s investment decision, so we have
to be specific about it. For example, under linear demand, u(q) is convex on [0,D(0)] and constant
thereafter. For constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, u(q) is concave for all values of
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
7That is, there is no non-empty interval (a, b), with a < b, such that u(q) is linear over (a, b).
8In Section 5, we extend the model to positive discounting.
9Since the seller makes zero profit in the long-run, his payoﬀ can also be interpreted as the value
of excursion above the long-run payoﬀ. Note that we are adopting the Dutta’s (1991) strong long-run
average criterion. Therefore, we can anticipate already at this point that the undiscounted equilibrium
is a true discounted equilibrium limit. This will be verified in section 4.
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Notice that we leave the investment costs out of the welfare function since, without
discounting, the timing of investment has no bearing on the net present value of its costs.
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 1 Along a social-optimal path, W(s) is linear, i.e., W(s0) = λs0 for some
constant λ.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose W(s) is not linear, so we have sa0
and sb0 with W(sa0) = λasa0, W(sb0) = λbsb0, and λa 6= λb, while in both cases T > 0
by assumption. Without loss of generality, assume λa > λb. Now, we note that due to
concavity of eu(.) the optimal qt is a constant path over a period [0, Ta+k] and we stretch
out (or shrink) the optimal path qat that produces W(sa0), to generate a path for case b:
q∗ = qat , over a period with Tb + k = (sb0/sa0)(Ta + k). It is obvious that this path q∗
produces welfare λasb0. Thus, the optimal path for sb0 must produce at least the same
welfare level: W(sb0) = λbsb0 ≥ λasb0, which contradicts the assumption of λa > λb.
The variable λ measures the marginal value of the resource, W 0(sa0) = λ. Surplus
maximization can thus be implemented as the maximization of the (marginal) value of
the resource λ, independent of time and level of the resource. Consider a short period ε
with continuous supply qt. Resource use over this period is εqt. Welfare accumulated over
this period is ε[eu(qt)−u] = λεqt. The marginal value of the resource is λ = [eu(qt)−u]/qt,
and the surplus maximization is thus equivalent to maximizing the average excursion
above the long-run payoﬀ. It is instructive to see Figure 1, where we can find the social
optimal supply level q = q∗∗ on the curve of utility eu(q) such that the line through (0, u)
and (q, eu(q)) has the steepest slope.10 Recall that utility eu(q) is concave, and thus q∗∗
must also satisfy eu(q∗∗) = u+ q∗∗eu0(q∗∗).
Since consumer surplus is u(q) = eu(q)− qeu0(q), we must have
u(q∗∗) = u. (4)
Proposition 1 In the social optimum, consumers receive reservation utility level u in
all stages, while producers receive all the resource surplus. Consumers do not benefit from
an increase in the resource stock, W 0(s0) = 0.
10We use one asterisk for equilibrium constants, and two asterisks for social optimum constants. Some
equilibrium constants are first presented as part of the buyer’s optimum, and these are therefore also
denoted by one asterisk.
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Proof. The first part of the proposition states that along the social optimal path,
the buyer is indiﬀerent between resource dependence and the substitute technology. This
part follows immediately from (4). The last part of the proposition then follows from the
definition of the buyer’s payoﬀ (2).
Consider what would be the first-best for the buyer side. This corresponds to a
situation where producers are perfectly competitive and investment is chosen to maximize
W (st) only. Competitive sellers rationally foresee when the buyer side is going to invest
and based on this, they choose a constant supply path to equalize prices across periods
before and after the investment. In this setting, we can think that the choice is not
only the overall period of resource use, T + k, but also a supply path qt that maximizes
consumer’s welfare (2). We can copy the template from the social optimum to show that
along consumers’ first-best a optimal path, welfare W (.) is linear, that is, W (s0) = λs0
for some constant λ. In figure 1, we can maximize the buyer’s value of the resource if we
find the supply level q∗ on the curve of utility surplus u(q) where the line through (0, u)
and (q, u(q)) has the steepest slope over its domain [0, qm], where restrict the domain
without loss of generality. We take restriction qm to be the static monopoly supply,
qm = argmaxπ(q), because this allows us to use it as a point of reference in the strategic
equilibrium. Obviously, the restriction must satisfy u¯ < u(qm), otherwise the resource
could not provide surplus above the long-run level.
If surplus u(q) is convex, the slope is steepest at the maximum supply level: the
buyers’ optimal resource supply is given by q∗ = qm = argmaxu(q). For the general
case, we search for the steepest line through (0, u) and (q, u(q)). If the optimal level
q∗ < qm, then q∗ must satisfy
u(q∗) = u+ q∗u0(q∗). (5)
As q∗ determines the date of investment, by T + k = s0/q∗, we have a simple graphical
determination of the consumers’ optimum. Relative to the social optimum, consumers
can increase their payoﬀ by forcing sellers to sell the resource faster:
Proposition 2 The resource supply in the buyers’ optimum exceeds resource supply in
social optimum: q∗ > q∗∗, and the period of resource dependence is shortened.
Proof. We consider the two cases: first when q∗ = qm and then when q∗ < qm. If q∗ =
qm , then by assumption u(q∗) > u, and since u(q) is strictly increasing (u0 = −qeu00 > 0),
it follows that q∗ > q∗∗. If q∗ < qm, then it does not follow directly by assumption, but
from (5) and u0 > 0, it follows that u(q∗) > u, and thus q∗ > q∗∗.
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The opposing interests are now clear: the seller side would like to delay investment as
much as possible (to spread supplies thinly over time), and the buyer side prefers faster
depletion.11 It is obvious that in the equilibrium of the game supplies and investment
time must lie between the extremes identified here.
For future reference, we define the buyer’s marginal value of the resource as λ∗ =
[u(q∗) − u]/q∗. In the buyer’s optimum, the consumers’ share in total resource surplus
V (s0) +W (s0) is λ∗s0; the sellers receive the remainder.
3 Strategic resource dependence
There are three types of agents in the model. First, producers of the resource form a
coherent cartel (from now on, the seller). Second, large number of competitive consumers
derive utility from resource consumption or, if present, from consuming the substitute
service provided by the substitute. Third, there is the consumers’ agent who cares only
about the consumer surplus. The buyers’ agent can aﬀect the surplus only by making
the decision to end the relationship with the seller. The decision is about changing
the demand infrastructure which requires coordinated action on the buyer side but we
abstract from the policy instrument implementing the change. In short, we interpreted
the decision as investment in substitute technologies. Since the only strategic actions are
taken by the seller and the buyer’s agent, from now on we use the words ‘buyers’ agent’
and ‘buyer’ interchangeably. There is one single market: the spot market for the resource
flow.
3.1 Timing and strategies
The economy has three stages, starting in initial stage before investment, t < T , labeled
with superscript ‘0’. The next stage follows investment, T ≤ t < T + k, also called the
post-investment stage, or labeled with superscript ‘1’. The final stage is after arrival of
the new substitute technology, t ≥ T + k. During the pre-investment stage, buyer and
seller can interact strategically, where the seller chooses a supply level q0, and the buyer
decides whether or not to invest, d ∈ {0, 1}. Since the investment decision is irreversible,
the game moves to the investment stage permanently once the buyer invests. During
11These results are consistent with the common view that the seller’s market power makes the resource-
depletion path more conservative (see Hotelling 1931). Buyers’ market power speeds up consumption
both in the optimal tariﬀ literature (see Karp-Newbery 1993) and strategic R&D and technology liter-
ature (see the papers cited in the introduction).
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the post-investment stage, there are no strategic interactions. The seller can only sell
the remaining stock in k periods (or the monopoly quantity qm if the stock is too large
to be sold in this time span), and the buyer side can only accept what is oﬀered to the
market.12 We denote the quantity sold in period t in the second stage by q1t . In the final
stage, all resources remaining at time T + k are left unused.
All strategic interaction thus takes place before investment. At any period t, if the
game is in the pre-investment stage, we denote the seller’s supply by q0t and assume that
there are three sub-stages with the following actions:
1. Seller chooses a supply q0t ;
2. Buyers’ agent chooses dt ∈ {0, 1};
3. If dt = 0, market clears at q0t . If dt = 1, the economy moves to the second stage.
We are interested in Markov-perfect strategies and look for seller strategies that are
functions of the form q0t = η(st). Similarly, strategies of the buyers’ agent are functions
of the stock and the supply oﬀer dt = μ(st, q0t ) ∈ {0, 1}.
3.2 Buyers’ problem
When buyers have taken the action to move to the substitute, the game is over: buyers
have no more decisions to make and the seller can only sell the remaining stock during
the transition period. When not yet used, the buyers’ strategic investment option will
aﬀect the supply levels. To describe the buyers’ payoﬀ, we need to make it contingent
on whether the strategic variable has been used or not. We define W I(st) as the value of
the excursion above the long-run payoﬀ measured again from current period t onwards,
immediately after investment when resource dependence still continues for k periods.
W I(st) is unambiguously determined by the seller’s post-investment supply policy which
is just q1t = min{qm, st/k} for the remaining sales window.13 If buyers’ decision is made
at some T with sT > 0, then
12For simplicity, we assumet that the buyers’ agent has no other instruments to influence the seller’s
behaviour than the investment decision.
13Recall that profit π(q) is concave so it is optimal to allocate the remaining stock evenly, or leave
some stock left if this would imply exceeding the monopoly quantity qm. In the presence of discounting,
the sales path is flat, but declining as in Hotelling (1931). However, it still holds that all strategic
interactions end at the investment date. We cover this case in Section 4.
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W I(sT ) =
½
k(u(st/k)− u¯) if sT < kqm
k(u(qm)− u¯) otherwise, (6)
It follows that for sT < kqm we have W I0(sT ) = u0(sT/k), which measures the scarcity
cost to the buyer from continued resource dependence.
Taking together the two periods before and post-investment, welfare (2) becomes
W (s0) =
Z T
0
[u(qt)− u]dt+W I(sT ) (7)
We assume that the seller has a strategy q0t = η(st), and based on the seller’s strategy
we find the strategy for the buyer to invest. The dynamics are best understood when
we consider supply constant over a small period [t, t + ε], and let ε converge to zero.
Using the above expression for W I(st) and assuming the seller’s strategy q0t = η(st), we
can write the expression for the payoﬀ before the investment, W (st), when the buyer
optimizes over a short period length ε:
W (st) = max
dt∈{0,1}
{[εu(η(st))− εu¯+W (st − εη(st))](1− dt) +W I(st)dt}. (8)
Term εu¯ is the direct cost from postponing the investment since the buyer side loses
long-run surplus u¯ for ε units of time by not investing today. As ε approaches zero, (8)
can be approximated as follows:
W (st) = max
dt∈{0,1}
{[εu0t − εu¯− εq0tW 0(st) +W (st)](1− d) +W I(st)d}, (9a)
where we use shorthands u0t = u(η(st)) and q0t = η(st). Thus, if choosing d = 0 is optimal,
then W (st) ≥W I(st) and
u0t = u¯+ q
0
tW
0(st). (10)
This is the key indiﬀerence throughout this paper. It says that the consumer surplus un-
der continuation of the resource dependence, u0t , covers the direct cost from continuing,
u¯, and the marginal reduction in payoﬀ from the fact that the stock available for con-
sumption during remaining overall period of resource dependence is depleted, q0tW 0(st).
Notably, this condition closely resembles the buyer’s optimum (5) if welfare functions
before W (.) and after investment W I(.) coincide. There is one important distinction.
Whereas the right-hand-side of the buyer’s optimum indiﬀerence condition (5) takes the
constant marginal value of the resource at the buyer’s optimal path and so defines a
constant q∗, the strategic buyer’s indiﬀerence condition (10) is based on the marginal
value of the current resource and so it defines a supply scheme q0t that is dependent on
the current resource level st.
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3.3 Seller’s problem
Let V I(sT ) denote the seller’s payoﬀ if buyers make their decision to end the relationship
at stock level sT . This value is simply given by
V I(sT ) =
½
kπ(st/k) if sT < kqm
kπ(qm) otherwise.
(11)
Let us then consider the seller’s problem before the decision is made. Let V (st)
denote the value of the remaining stock to the seller conditional on no investment before
t. For short period ε, and given the buyers’ strategy dt = μ(st, q0t ), supply in the next ε
periods is q0t if μ(st, q0t ) = 0. The economy immediately moves to the investment stage if
μ(st, q0t ) = 1. The seller’s best response satisfies
V (st) = max{q0t }
{[επ(q0t ) + V (st − εq0t )](1− μ(st, q0t )) + V I(st)μ(st, q0t ). (12)
When ε approaches zero, this value can be approximated by (letting μ(·) = μ(st, q0t )):
V (st) = max{q0t }
{[επ(q0t )− εq0t V 0(st) + V (st)](1− μ(·)) + V I(st)μ(·)} (13)
Given μ(st, q0t ), the seller can choose if there will be investment or not. If choice μ = 0
is implemented, then by (13), we must have
−q0t V 0(st) + π(q0t ) = 0. (14)
If choice μ = 1 is implemented, then
V (st) = V I(st). (15)
From these conditions we can immediately see that the seller always prefers to continue
the relationship. Let q0t ≤ st/k, then
V 0(st) = ψ(q0t ) ≥ ψ(
st
k
) > ψ(
st
k
) +
st
k
ψ0(
st
k
) ≥ V I0(st).
The first equality follows from (14), the second weak inequality is by assumption, the
third strict inequality follows from a negative price slope, and the last weak inequality
follows from (11). Thus, the ’smooth pasting’ condition does not hold for V for the
seller. Let s∗ be the stock level at which investment takes place, than V 0(s∗) > V I0(s∗),
and the inequality extends to all larger stock levels. Buyers decision implies a binding
time-to-sell constraint for the seller; the seller will never end the dependence before the
buyer wants to end it, as it is always profitable to extend the sales period beyond T + k
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when discounting is absent.14 For this reason, when the stock level is public knowledge
and q0t ≤ st/k - the seller has no reason to supply more before investment when compared
to the supplies after investment - it will be the buyers’ indiﬀerence that determines the
time to end the resource dependency.
Lemma 2 If for all st > s∗, q0t ≤ st/k, then the seller prefers continuation to stopping
for all st > s∗, V (st) > V I(st).
As we will see below, with publicly observed stock levels st, the condition q0t ≤ st/k
always holds.15
The value V I(st) is depicted in Fig. 2 as a solid line for stock levels below s∗, describing
the post-investment stage, where this value is the actual value of the stock, and then as
a dotted line for stocks above s∗, where this value only acts as an opportunity value.
Sales strategy prior to investment, q0t = η(st), has to be solved together with the buyers’
strategy, and we turn next to this.16
3.4 Equilibrium
Establishing and characterizing equilibrium supply is a simple undertaking based on the
analysis of buyers’ indiﬀerence between continuation and stopping, given that the seller
side never prefers stopping. We first prove that (6) defines the buyer’s welfare any time
before investment:
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, the buyer is indiﬀerent between continuing the resource de-
pendence and investing at any given t prior to the investment date:
W (st) =W I(st) for all st ≥ s∗ (16)
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume W (st) > W I(st) at some st > s∗.
The inequality implies that the buyer will always choose dt = 0 in (8), irrespective of
14We will derive this same condition also with discounting but there we need restrictions on the utility
formulation.
15However, when stock levels are unobserved, we will see that the condition can break down: the seller
may supply more before investment as compared to supply after investment. Such a strategy can be
used to make the buyer to believe that the stock is larger than it actually is.
16If the equilibrium value function V (s) is convex for s ≥ s∗, supplies increase as the stock is depleted;
for a concave V (s), the opposite holds. We will show, after studying the equilibrium in general, that
V (s) is convex when s is close to the investment level s∗; convexity of V (s) holds for all stock levels if
u(.) is concave.
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the seller’s supply. In turn, the seller is not constrained to reduce supplies and he can
extend the period of resource dependence to obtain higher prices from all periods. Supply
will fall arbitrarily close to zero, the utility excursion compared to u¯ becomes negative
for a period of unbounded length, and W (st) becomes negative (2), which contradicts
W (st) > W I(st).
It is thus the buyers’ indiﬀerence that determines equilibrium supply policy, q0t =
η(st). The buyer’s indiﬀerence condition (16) together with (10) requires
u(q0t )− u¯− q0t u0(st/k) = 0 if st < kqm (17)
u(q0t )− u¯ = 0 otherwise, (18)
because W 0t(st) = u0(st/k) when st < kqm, and W 0t(st) = 0 otherwise as the stock level
does not aﬀect supply if st > kqm. To illustrate, assume a concave surplus u and see
Fig. 3. The slope of u(q) at st/k determines the scarcity cost of continuation. A line
with this slope and intercept u¯, the waiting cost of the substitute, intersects with u(q)
at the equilibrium supply level. As the stock is depleted, the increase in the slope of
u(q) at st/k reflects the increasing scarcity and the equilibrium supply q0t compensating
the buyers must increase. There exists s∗ such that the line u¯ + q0t u0(s∗/k) is tangent
to u(q) (as in Fig 1). At this point, q0t = s∗/k. Note that this supply equals q∗, the
buyers’ first-best supply as it maximizes the buyers’ average payoﬀ from this stock level
onwards. The seller cannot compensate the buyer for continuation after the stock has
fallen below s∗ because the buyer can implement his first-best by ending the relationship
there. Alternatively put,
W 0(st) > λ∗ = [u(q∗)− u]/q∗ for s < s∗.
For the general case, it is important to distinguish two cases. First, we say that
the buyer has a strong substitute if the buyers’ optimum requires more supply than
the static monopoly supply. Because of the restriction on domain, a strong substitute
implies q∗ = qm. Recall that a larger q∗ follows from a larger long-run surplus u¯ as
the buyer wants to consume the resource faster the better the outside option (the lower
is c). Second, we say that buyer has a weak substitute if q∗ < qm. Equilibrium under
strong substitute is described in the first proposition below. When the substitute is weak,
buyer’s continuation considerations depend more on the stock dynamics, i.e., how much
there is left of the stock for the transition period. Equilibrium under weak substitute is
described in the second proposition below.
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Proposition 3 If the buyer has a strong substitute (q∗ = qm), there exists a unique
Markov-perfect equilibrium. The investment stock and supply path satisfy s∗ = kqm, q0t =
u−1(u¯), q1t = qm. The consumers only share in total resource surplus after investment,
W (s0) = λ∗s∗.
Proof. The supply levels follows immediately from (17)-(18) if we can show that
s∗ = kqm. For all st ≥ kqm, buyer has no reason to invest when the seller oﬀers q0t =
u−1(u¯), and the seller does not want to trigger investment by supplying less. We are left
to prove that s∗ < kqm is impossible. By the fact that q∗ = qm gives the highest surplus,
u(q) ≤ u+ u(q
m)− u
qm
q , ∀q ≤ qm.
On the other hand, if s∗ < kqm, then (17) must hold for all s∗ < st < kqm. But this
implies that exists small ε > 0 such that
u0(st/k) >
u(qm)− u
qm
for all st in qm − ε < st/k < qm. Combining,
qu0(st/k) > q
u(qm)− u
qm
≥ u(q)− u
for all q ≤ qm, which is the contradiction. Thus, we must have s∗ = kqm.
We are now left with the more interesting case of weak substitute (q∗ < qm). Recall
that the buyers’ first-best supply q∗ satisfies
u(q∗) = u¯+ q∗u0(q∗)
and that buyers’ never accept stock levels below kq∗: buyers can always implement their
first-best by ending the relationship at st = kq∗. It thus clear that only if s∗ ≥ kq∗, (17)
can be satisfied. This way q∗ defines the lowest stock level where investment takes place.
However, since the consumer surplus is not generally concave, buyers may also end the
relationship at some higher stock level s∗ > kq∗, because the scarcity cost u0(s/k) may
locally increase above u0(q∗) as s/k declines from s0/k towards q∗. To deal with this,
we define s∗ to be the first stock level below s0 such that u0(s∗/k) = u0(q∗). Stock s∗ is
unique for given s0, and we have
u0(st/k) < u0(q∗)
for all s∗ < st ≤ kqm. By continuity, q0t = η(st) must vary with the remaining stock for
s∗ < st < kqm to keep the buyer indiﬀerent between stopping and continuing.
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Proposition 4 If the buyer has a weak substitute (q∗ < qm), there exists a unique
Markov-perfect equilibrium with s∗ as defined above, q0t defined by (17)-(18), and q1t =
s∗/k.
Proof. As in the previous proposition, it suﬃces to prove that s∗ is determined
properly. Clearly, we cannot take s∗ to be smaller as such would imply an infeasible
resource supply from (17). We will now prove that s∗ cannot be larger either. For this,
it is suﬃcient to prove that s∗ maximizes the value of the resource to the seller. But this
follows from Lemma 2: the seller maximizes profits by continuing as long as possible.
These results suggest an interesting limiting case. Recall that qm is defined by demand
only but u¯ depends also on c. By varying c we can choose the socially optimal supply
such that q∗∗ = u−1(u¯) = qm, implying, by Proposition 3, that the equilibrium coincides
with the first-best. Making the substitute weaker delays consumption both in the social
optimum and in the equilibrium, but more in the latter. Thus, we have
Proposition 5 In a strategic equilibrium, resource consumption exceeds the socially op-
timal level, and falls short of the buyer’s first-best level.
We find the case of a weak substitute most relevant and use next the equilibrium
conditions to characterize equilibrium supply path. When the remaining stock is larger
than kqm, adoption of the substitute technology today would imply that some stock is
left over due to the fact the seller does not prefer to exceed the monopoly quantity during
the technology transition period. Therefore, to keep the buyer side willing to continue,
the seller only needs to compensate the loss from postponing the arrival of the long-run
surplus, u(q0t )− u¯ = 0 (see 18), leading to an initially flat supply path. As st falls below
kqm, continuation increases scarcity since the stock available for consumption during the
technology transition period is depleted, which increases the buyer’s cost from continuing
resource dependence and thus commands a larger compensation. This compensation is
measured by q0t u0(
st
k ) in (17), which jumps to a positive value at st = kq
m. In case of
concave surplus u(q), supply increases as st declines below kqm until reaching s = s∗, after
which the supply path is flat again but now at level s∗/k. Under nonconcave surplus, the
increase in supply may not be monotonic as the buyer’s scarcity cost may vary. However,
when the equilibrium path approaches the investment point, supplies must increase, so
that our main conclusion holds irrespective of the utility functional form.
Proposition 6 Under weak substitute, the equilibrium supply path qt is
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1. constant at level u−1(u¯) when st > kqm;
2. varying over time in u−1(u¯) ≤ qt ≤ q∗ when s∗ < st < kqm, but ultimately increasing
to q∗ as st approaches s∗;
3. strictly increasing for all s∗ < st < kqm if consumer surplus u(q) is concave
We have depicted a supply path in Fig. 4, where we also show the buyers’ optimal
supply path as a flat line at level s∗/k.
4 Unobserved reserves
The size of the remaining stock is what determines the seller’s ability to entice the buyer
side to postpone actions ending the resource dependence. In the above strategic equi-
librium, it is obviously critical that the buyer side can observe how much resource there
is left, otherwise the seller might take advantage of the buyers’ imperfect information
for the right timing of the infrastructure change. To see how the seller might distort
the buyer’s investment decision, see Fig. 4 again and note that the larger is the seller’s
stock, the lower is the equilibrium supply (earlier points on the sales path are associated
with larger stocks). In this precise sense, a large stock implies more market power than a
small stock. If the stock is not observed by the buyer side, a small seller can potentially
mimic the large seller’s policy of reducing supplies and thereby extend the investment
period from what would hold for the small seller under perfect observability.
To extend the model to cover this situation, we assume that the privately observed
initial stock can take values from an interval [sL0 , sH0 ], where the distribution is uniform.
The range of diﬀerent seller types is identified with label i, so that we write for the initial
reserve, si0, and thus the seller’s behavioral strategy maps from the history of the game
and type, (ht, si0), to current sales qit. The buyer still observes qt in addition to history ht
before making the investment choice, dt ∈ {0, 1}, but has only beliefs on the seller type
si0. Cumulative past sales Qt will be the history, ht = Qt, as this will be suﬃcient for
updating of beliefs in the equilibrium that we discuss.
To set up the framework, let us assume that all remaining seller types have a strategy
that asks them to supply the same quantity qpt = η(Qt, si0) after a given history Qt. We
proceed by determining how large qpt needs to be to entice the buyer side to continue, and
how the buyer rationally infers what seller types find it individually optimal to follow
this strategy. Note first that the buyer can force information revelation by investing:
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it is individually rational for all i to choose qi = [si0 − Qt]/k in the post-investment
phase, so that the underlying stock can be inferred from the supply.17 Consider then
the buyer’s payoﬀ immediately after investment, given a uniform posterior of possible
remaining stock levels [sLt , sHt ],
W I(Qt) = θ−1t
Z sHt
sLt
ku(sit/k)ds
i
t − ku¯, (19)
where θt = sHt − sLt .18 We describe shortly how posterior θt = sHt − sLt is updated, using
sellers’ individual rationality, but is should be clear that the investment payoﬀ W I(Qt)
depends on Qt as it determines how the potential initial stock levels have changed. Given
the knowledge of W I(Qt) and the observed q
p
t = η(Qt, si0), it is straightforward to define
the buyer’s payoﬀ from not investing using the same procedures as in the deterministic
case. This payoﬀ depends now on the cumulative sales and is denoted by W (Qt).19 Note
that W 0(Qt) < 0 as Qt is cumulative sales rather than the remaining stock. For a short
period length, if the buyer is just indiﬀerent between continuing and stopping, we must
have W (Qt) =W I(Qt) and
u(qpt ) = u¯− qptW I0(Qt) (20)
where the right-hand side is the opportunity cost of the continued resource dependence.
Given the uniform posterior, we have a closed-form expression for W I0(Qt):20
W I0(Qt) = θ−1t [u(s
L
t /k)− u(sHt /k)]. (21)
Substitution of (21) in (20) gives the equivalent of (17)-(18):21
u(qpt ) = u¯+ q
p
t θ
−1
t [u(s
H
t /k)− u(sLt /k)] (22)
This equation simply determines the minimum level of supply that the sellers have to
provide not to trigger investment, given the beliefs on the lower and upper bound for the
17No type will choose qi > qm, as in the deterministic case but, for convenience, we will not keep track
of this condition as it has no material aﬀect on the equilibrium.
18For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we leave out the possibility that kqm < sit for
some seller types. The formulation including this option is W I(Qt) =
R sHt
s˜t
θtku(min{qm, sit/k})dsit−ku¯.
19Formally, we define the game in discrete time as previously but characterize the equilibrium condi-
tions for a very short period length. Given the observed qpt = η(Qt, s
i
0), the buyer’s value function over
a short period of time satifies W (Qt) = maxdt∈{0,1}{[εu(qpt ))− εu¯+W (st + εqpt )](1− dt) +W I(Qt)dt}.
20The precise RHS is θt[u(min{qm, sLt /k})− u(min{qm, sHt /k})].
21Notice that under perfect observability we had two conditions dependent on whether st/k > qm, or
not (see (17)-(18)). Here, we do not need to make this distinction, but when written out full, in the
above formula one should read min{u(qm), u(sHt /k)} and min{u(qm), u(sLt /k)}, rather than u(sHt /k)
and u(sLt /k), respectively.
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stock size sLt and sHt . Note the close analog of (17) and (22): we must have −W I0(Q∗) =
W I0(s∗) and thus η(Q∗, si0) = q∗ at the investment point, where Q∗ is the cumulative sale
that triggers investment. Thus, if the seller type remains unobserved at the investment
point, quantity supplied q∗ is exactly the same when triggering investment under perfect
information. In a similar fashion as in the deterministic case, when W I0(Qt) > λ∗ there
is no supply qpt that satisfies the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition. The buyer thus always
invests when
u(sHt /k)− u(sLt /k) ≥ θtλ∗. (23)
We are now ready to explain and prove our conjecture for an equilibrium. When
θ0 → 0, the initial stock becomes precisely known and the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition
coincides with the perfect information analog. It seems therefore reasonable to think that
for small θ0, the equilibrium is not that diﬀerent from the perfect information equilibrium
where the one seller type prefers to supply until the buyer’s indiﬀerence breaks down.
Similarly, when θ0 is small, all potential seller types find it individually rational to follow
qpt = η(Qt, si0), given the buyer’s beliefs that we will specify shortly, until Qt = Q∗ and
η(Q∗t , si0) = q∗. In such an equilibrium, all private information is revealed by the buyer’s
action at the investment point but not before. This equilibrium has two main properties:
(i) timing of investment is public information (determined by buyer whose beliefs are
publicly known); and (ii) no supply shocks take place before the investment.
When θ0 is suﬃciently large, the above conjecture cannot be an equilibrium: when
there are suﬃciently small sellers in the distribution of types, they will run out of the stock
before the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition (22) breaks down. These stock owners prefer to
trigger investment earlier, that is, before they have run out of stock. This equilibrium has
the following main properties: (i) timing of investment is private information (determined
by seller whose type is privately known); and (ii) there is a persistent possibility of a
supply shock during the period of strategic resource dependence. We call the equilibrium
with these properties risky.
Whether the equilibrium is risky or not depends on the riskiness of the underlying
seller type distribution. There will be a cutoﬀ value, which we denote by θ∗, such that
when θ ≤ θ∗, the equilibrium is nonrisky, and when θ > θ∗, it will be risky. To determine
this cutoﬀ, we need to find out the marginal seller type for which it is individually
rational to follow the pooling strategy qpt = η(Qt, si0) until the buyer invests. To this end,
we work backwards in time, from time T when the buyer invests and (23) is satisfied.
For all periods t < T , the buyer indiﬀerence determines the supply level qpt required to
prevent investment, and the seller, which is of type i, determines whether he will supply
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qpt , or alternatively, whether he can gain from revealing his identity i (by supplying less
than qpt = η(Qt, si0) and thus breaking the buyer’s indiﬀerence). We can write the payoﬀ
for seller type i if it triggers investment today after sales history Qt as:
V I(Qt, si0) = kπ(
si0 −Qt
k
). (24)
Seller of type i chooses to supply qpt = η(Qt, si0) to make the buyer to continue if
V (Qt, si0) ≥ V I(Qt, si0). Under continuation, the first-order conditions imply
qpt VQ(Qt, s
i
0) + π(q
p
t ) = 0 (25)
which is analogous to condition (14) in the perfect information case. At the time of
investment, V (Qt, si0) = V I(Qt, si0) for all sellers i that have not triggered investment
before T . A very short period ε before investment T , we have that V ≥ V I if and only if
π0(sit/k) ≤
π(qpt )
qpt
. (26)
So let us define the marginal continuing type smin, at the time the buyer invests, by
π0(smin/k) =
π(q∗)
q∗
. (27)
If sLT ≥ smin, then it follows that (26) is satisfied for all sit ≥ sLt , and when q
p
t decreases
going back in time from T , and sLt increases, (26) will be satisfied for all t ≤ T .22 By
integration, we have V (Qt, si0) > V I(Qt, si0) for all t. On the other hand, if sLT < smin,
then by integration over [t, T ] where t is shortly before T we have V (Qt, sL0 ) < V I(Qt, sL0 ).
In this case, the seller type L would rather trigger investment at t < T . Thus sLT ≥ smin
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition to define a non-risky distribution. At period T ,
the high-stock level sHT is, in turn, derived from (23). From the value of sLT = smin and
the associated value of sHT , we can determine the maximum spread θ
∗ that is not risky,
searching for the minimum value of θ for which the following equation holds:
u(smin/k + θ/k)− u(smin/k) = θλ∗. (28)
We can now graphically demonstrate how the risky distribution is determined. In
Fig. 5 we show, in (sL, sH)-space, buyer’s and seller’s indiﬀerence curves, IBand IS,
22Recall from the perfect information case that suplies need not monotonically increase along the
equilibrium path if u is not concave. The same obviously holds here. However, q∗ is the highest possible
supply level before investment.
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respectively. A given IB traces stock levels that keep the buyer indiﬀerent as defined by
(22) for a given supply qt; lower indiﬀerence curves are associated with higher supply. It
is instructive to start from the 45-degree line where θ = 0 and so the underlying supply
equals the perfect information equilibrium level. The perfect information equilibrium
progresses along this line, e.g., from C to A such that at A the buyer’s indiﬀerence breaks
down. Point A thus corresponds to stock levels (s∗, s∗) and supply level q∗. Consider a
small informational asymmetry, for example, such that prior θ0 > 0 puts point D as a
starting point. Then, if the equilibrium is nonrisky, it moves from D to B where supply
is again q∗ (B is on the same indiﬀerence curve as A). However, point B is critical as also
the seller’s indiﬀerence curve IS passes through B. Curve IS is defined jointly by (22)
and
qpt π
0(sLt /k) = π(q
p
t ), (29)
so that IS gives for each supply level qpt the marginal continuing seller type. Note that
for higher supply levels (lower IB), the marginal type is higher (IS slopes downwards),
and that the type at B is si0 = smin. The horizontal diﬀerence between lines CA and
DB is thus the critical θ∗. For any θ ≤ θ∗, equilibrium starts from point between the
two lines and is nonrisky: investment date is determined by the buyer and this is public
information. For any θ > θ∗, equilibrium is risky. Consider, e.g., point E where the
informational asymmetry is so large that small seller types find it individually rational
to trigger investment before the buyer’s lowest indiﬀerence curve passing through A and
B is reached. Then, the equilibrium first progresses from E to F where (29) becomes
binding for the smallest sellers in the distribution. From this point onwards, it moves
along IS so that the buyer revises the posterior θt after each period of no supply shock by
ruling out seller types that should have triggered the shock by t. The posterior becomes
more precise, conditional on no shock, until reaching θ∗ at B where the buyer invests.
Proposition 7 If sH0 − sL0 ≤ θ∗ (> θ∗), a nonrisky (risky) equilibrium with the above
properties exists.
Proof. See above for the construction of θ∗ and equilibrium beliefs. Fig. 5 assumes
nice curvature properties for the indiﬀerence curves that follow, for example, when u is
concave. However, nothing in the construction of equilibrium beliefs requires concavity
(general version of Fig. 5 is available on request).
We consider now out of equilibrium beliefs that support the conjectured equilibrium
outcome. There are two cases to consider: at each t, the seller may oﬀer qt > q
p
t or
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qt < q
p
t . If qt > q
p
t , any belief will do. The buyer can become more optimistic relative
to the equilibrium belief about the stock size on observing qt > q
p
t (strictly prefers
continuation to investment). The buyer can become more pessimistic about the stock
size when observing qt > q
p
t . Depending on qt and on the explicit formulation of the
beliefs, the buyer may or may not invest. In all cases, no seller type gains from deviating
from the equilibrium to this outcome.
Conditional on observing qt < q
p
t , the buyer’s belief about the stock size must become
more pessimistic relative to equilibrium beliefs. If the buyer became more optimistic and
would not invest, then all sellers have reason to supply less. More optimistic beliefs after
observing qt < q
p
t are thus inconsistent. Supplying qt < q
p
t will automatically trigger
more pessimistic beliefs and investment. Given this, no seller prefers to deviate from the
equilibrium.
In Fig. 6 we show a time path for supply in a risky equilibrium. Similar as to the
perfect information case, concavity of u ensures that supplies are increasing throughout
the equilibrium (conditional on no shock), although supplies must ultimately increase
for any u. Initially, there can be a supply period with zero probability of a supply
shock (corresponding to EF in Fig. 5) but ultimately small sellers can be ruled out only
by observing no supply shock (FB in Fig. 5). Two such small seller types with their
deviations are depicted in Figure 6.
5 Discounting
Discounting is obviously an important element in resource use when the relevant time
horizon is at least decades. In the traditional Hotelling model, discounting is what makes
markets in diﬀerent periods to diﬀer, which, in the presence of market power, leads
to intertemporal price discrimination. Discounting is thus one reason to discriminate
buyers in diﬀerent periods. Another reason is the buyers’ changing opportunity cost
of continuing the resource dependence due to stock depletion, which we have identified
in the undiscounted analysis. The purpose of this section is to explain how these two
distinct reasons for price discrimination evolve as the stock depletion progresses. The
main case that we want to emphasize is the one where supplies initially decline, when
the stock is large, as in a traditional Hotelling exhaustible resource market. However,
ultimately supplies must increase, when stock declines and the buyers’ outside option
starts to drive the equilibrium dynamics as in the undiscounted case.
We focus on the full information case here. First, we explain how the payoﬀ expres-
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sions and the relevant indiﬀerence conditions prior to investment extend to the discounted
case. It becomes clear that the equilibrium implied by these conditions converge to the
undiscounted limit we solved already. Second, we extend the previous method of using
the buyers’ indiﬀerence for finding the investment time, and we solve the equilibrium for
the constant relative risk aversion formulation (CRRA).
Let discounting be positive, r > 0. In the post-investment phase, the equilibrium
does not change much: for the seller, there is a unique profit-maximizing supply path,
equalizing present-value marginal revenues over the remaining sales period, and resulting
in an associated value function V I(sT ) at the time of investment.
In the pre-investment period, equation (12) determining the seller’s strategy q0t = η(st)
becomes
V (st) = max{q0t }
{[επ(q0t ) + e−rV (st − εq0t )](1− μ(st, q0t )) + V I(st)μ(st, q0t )}. (30)
For a short time period ε, value function V (st) satisfies
−q0t V 0(st) + π(q0t )− rV (st) = 0. (31)
The unique seller’s supply path after investment also defines the buyers’ welfare
W I(sT ), where we note that sinceW I(sT ) measures only value of the excursion above the
long-run situation where flow payoﬀ u¯ is achieved, the overall welfare at the investment
time is equal to W I(sT )+ u¯/r −I. The buyers’ payoﬀ before investment is now given by
W (st) + u¯/r − I = max
dt∈{0,1}
{[εu(η(st)) + e−rW (st − εη(st)) + e−ru¯/r − e−rI](1− dt)
+W I(st)dt}. (32)
Letting ε converge to zero, we find the positive discounting equivalent of (10):
u0t ≥ u¯− rI + rW I(st) + q0tW I0(st). (33)
When the buyer is indiﬀerent between continuation and stopping, (33) holds as an
equality with obvious interpretation: waiting cost of continuation is now u¯− rI and, in
addition to the depletion eﬀect q0tW I0(st), buyers must receive return on the asset they are
holding (investment option), rW I(st). Assuming that the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition is
uniformly continuous in (st, q0t ), it is also continuously diﬀerentiable in r, and so it is clear
that for r→ 0, the equilibrium uniformly converges to the zero-discounting equilibrium.
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Thus, the zero-discounting equilibrium describes well the equilibrium features of a low-
discount rate equilibrium.
We will now explain under what conditions we can still use the buyers’ indiﬀerence in
determining the investment point. We will argue that the seller would always prefer con-
tinuation above investment when the supply path is suﬃciently smooth at the investment
point. Such smoothness is ensured by CRRA utility.
Let qI refer to optimal monopoly supply immediately after investment. With zero
discounting, we had u0(qI) = W I0(s∗) as qI equals the consumption level throughout
the post-investment phase until the substitute arrives. With positive discounting, this
equation does not hold. Recall that under positive discounting, supply qt after in-
vestment satisfies π0(qt) = ertλ, for some λ > 0 (marginal revenues are equalized in
present value). Thus, when the resource stock increases by small amount ∆s, then sup-
ply changes ∆qt satisfy π00(qt)∆qt = ert∆λ, for some ∆λ such that
R T+k
T ∆qtdt = ∆s,
that is,
R T+k
T
ert
π00(qt)dt = ∆s/∆λ. For notation, let us use μt =
π0(qt)
u0(qt) =
q?u00(qt)
?u0(qt) + 1. The
value of μ measures one minus the relative risk aversion.
W I0(s∗) =
∆W I0(s)
∆s
=
R T+k
T e
−rtu0(qt)∆qtdtR T+k
T ∆qtdt
=
R T+k
T e
−rtμtπ0(qt)∆qtdtR T+k
T ∆qtdt
=
R T+k
T μt∆qtdtR T+k
T ∆qtdt
λ =
R T+k
T μt∆qtdtR T+k
T μT∆qtdt
u0(qI). (34)
The diﬀerence between W I0(s∗) and u0(qI) is caused by the diﬀerence between the
average value of μt over the post-investment period [T, T + k], and its value at time T .
It is clear that, for utility with constant relative risk aversion, W I0(s∗) = u0(qI). If utility
has decreasing relative risk aversion, relative risk aversion will increase with decreasing
qt, and μt will increase, so that W I0(s∗) > u0(qI). Similarly, if utility has increasing
relative risk aversion, W I0(s∗) 6 u0(qI).
Furthermore, we will show that the seller’s value function has a kink at the time of
investment, V 0(s∗) > V I0(s∗) when W I0(s∗) = u0(qI), so the seller would always prefer
continuation rather than stopping in such a situation. In this paragraph, changes in k,
play a role in the argument, and so when convenient, we write the seller’s payoﬀ as a
function of both the stock level and the period length k. That is, we write V I(st, k) and
V I(st) interchangeably, and similarly V Is (st, k) and V I0(st). Flow profits are concave by
assumption, and supplies strictly positive at the end of the overall sales period, qT+k > 0,
so it is clear that the seller’s value of the resource increases with the period length
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k, V Ik (st, k) > 0. After investment, the value function satisfies the following Bellman
equation
V I(s∗, k) = επ(qI) + e−rV (s∗ − εqI , k − ε). (35)
Taking the limit for ε→ 0 (leaving k out of notation), we get
π(qI)− rV I(s∗)− qIV Is (s∗)− V Ik (s∗) = 0. (36)
Thus, π(qI) > rV I(s∗) + qIV I0(s∗). This together with continuous supply implied by
CRRA and value matching, V (s∗) = V I(s∗), implies V 0(s∗) > V I0(s∗).
Now, we know that for CRRA utility, the equilibrium investment point is determined
by the breakdown of the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition. Let us see how this works and
assume eu(q) = qσ, so that ψ(q) = σqσ−1, π(q) = σqσ, and u(q) = (1 − σ)qσ. One can
derive
V I(s) = σAsσ
W I(s) = (1− σ)Asσ − 1− e
−rk
r
u¯,
where A =
³
ω
1−e−ωk
´σ ³
1−e−ωσk
ωσ
´
and ω = r
1−σ . Notice that A→ k1−σ for r → 0 (as one
should expect). For the investment to yield a positive return, we assume e
−rk
r u¯− I > 0.
The buyers’ indiﬀerence condition (33) becomes
qσ =
e−rku¯− rI
1− σ + rAs
σ + qσAsσ−1. (37)
where, for convenience of notation, we substituted q for q0t .
Proposition 8 Assume σ(1− e−ωk)σ > 1− e−ωσk. Then,
s∗ = [
e−rku¯− rI
(1− σ)2A −σ1−σ − (1− σ)rA
]−1/σ
q∗ = A
1
σ−1 s∗
For s ≥ s∗ but suﬃciently close to s∗, seller’s supply q0t = η(st) is defined by (37) and
declining in st. For s suﬃciently large, q0t = η(st) is increasing in st.
We depict the equilibrium time path for supply in Fig. 7, as well as the buyers’
optimal path. The latter involves just choosing the highest supply path such that (i)
prices are equal in present value and (ii) the stock remaining at T ∗ is consumed during
the technology transition period. The equilibrium s∗ is, like in the undiscounted case,
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exactly equal to the buyers’ optimal s∗ because, due to CRRA, in the post-investment
phase the seller supplies a competitive path in both cases. In fact, the CRRA formula-
tion implies unit demand elasticity which eliminates the seller’s ability to discriminate
buyers’ in diﬀerent periods after the investment. The two paths in Fig. 6 are therefore
identical during the technology transition periods, starting at T ∗ and T , respectively.
However, before investment, the strategic seller can discriminate buyers in diﬀerent pe-
riods according to (37) and delay the arrival of the substitute as in the undiscounted
case.
We find the equilibrium s∗ in the Proposition by usingW I0(s∗) = u0(q), which defines
q∗, in (37) and noting that the buyers’ indiﬀerence can hold only if σ(1 − e−ωk)σ >
1 − e−ωσk. This latter condition can be seen as a restriction on rk; if either discount
rate or period k is suﬃciently large, investment will take place immediately without any
period of strategic interaction. Given this condition, it is straightforward to verify that
q0t = η(st) defined by (37) is decreasing in s for s > s∗.23
Finally, we note that equilibrium supply q0t = η(st) cannot satisfy the buyers’ indif-
ference (37) for a stock suﬃciently large. The reason is that seller’s unrestricted supply
policy, which would be followed in the absence of the substitute, is increasing in s and
thus at some point above q0t = η(st) defined by (37). Thus, for large stock levels, the
seller prefers to sell more than needed to prevent the buyer from investing (although
not the same quantity as the unrestricted seller). This explains the early part of the
equilibrium sales path in Fig. 7.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered strategic interactions between sellers of depletable resource
and consumers who have interests in ending their dependence on the resource. We
modeled the situation using a framework that departs from explicit bargaining but allows
oﬀers and responses such that neither party is in explicit leadership. The approach seems
relevant since there is significant coordination of actions on both sides of the market, but
at the same time explicit cooperation of the two sides is not feasible by the diﬃculty of
enforcing international agreements. The key question in the relationship is when to start
23Condition (37) implicitly defines two values of q given s > s∗. The equilibrium strategy must satisfy
dV 0(s)/dq < 0 where V 0(s) is given by (31) and evaluated at (s, q) = (s∗, q∗). Condition σ(1− e−ωk)σ >
1−e−ωσk ensures that this holds and implies that the lower trajectory ending at (s∗, q∗) is the equilibrium
strategy.
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the process ending the resource dependence, that is, when to change the demand. The
process changing the demand takes time and therefore a potentially significant fraction
of the resource has to be saved for the transition period. Our insights to the problem
follow from this simple allocation problem.
The main insight from our analysis is that producers’ market power is reduced over
time as continuing the relationship becomes more costly to consumers when the stock
available for the demand transition is depleted. This means that change in demand
becomes more relevant as a choice, leading to the conclusion that producers must increase
supplies over time. When information about the size of the remaining reserve is private,
we found that the continued relationship is costly to consumers not only because of
the stock depletion but also because of a possible supply shock. The possibility arises
from small sellers’ incentive to mimic large sellers’ supply policies and delay the demand
change by more than what their stock size justifies.
What are the main lessons from these results for understanding the oil market? First,
we believe it is the insight that energy technology policies in oil-importing countries can
act as an increasingly eﬀective strategic instrument, destroying in part producers scarcity
rents. While in general this insight is not new, our approach, where the transition is not a
one-time event, is the first to deliver explicitly increasing supplies in a stationary market
environment.
Second, OPEC’s market power must not be underestimated because of reserve un-
certainty and the related possibility of future scarcity when stocks are much lower than
expected, and the fact importing countries must rely on these stocks during a period of
energy infrastructure change. While OPEC may not be cohesive enough for such a ma-
neuver, individual member countries have stocks large enough such that an unexpected
shortfall in estimated reserves can permanently aﬀect the oil market. In particular, future
research might benefit from considering market power in the changing oil market where
production shifts towards unconventional energy sources, as easily exploitable conven-
tional oil stocks must at some point become scarce. When moving to renewables and
unconventional oil, the market becomes more capacity constrained when facing short run
shocks, potentially increasing market power of those holding the remaining conventional
oil stocks.
On a theoretical level, there are some obvious extensions. Adding a fringe of compet-
itive producers would reduce the seller’s market power in a rather straightforward way;
the fringe would free-ride on the seller’s market power by selling first when the prices
are high. Uncertainty about the technology transition period would aﬀect the precise
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timing of investment and the level of the supply path, but not the basic insights. A
less straightforward extension is a reversed asymmetric information situation where the
buyer side privately knows whether the adoption decision has been made but the resource
stock size is public information. Alternatively, under the R&D interpretation, the buyer
privately knows the state of the technology. We leave these interesting topics open for
future research.
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Figure 1: Determination of socially optimal supply
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Figure 2: Seller’s value function
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Figure 3: Determination of equilibrium q0t
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Figure 4: Equilibrium and buyers’ optimal supply
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Figure 5: Unobserved reservoir level
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Figure 6: Risky equilibrium supply
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Figure 7: Equilibrium supply path under discounting
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